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THE WOMEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT IN AFRICA
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CUSTOMARY LAW REFORM
Takyiwaah Manuh*
I. Introduction
The Women, Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF)
movement emerged out of the United Nation's Decade for Women
(1975-1985) as the legal counterpart to the 'women and development'
(WID) approach of development agencies, governments and NGOs to
improve the position of women in their communities. It is organized
by local women lawyers with financial support from international
groups in Europe and the US, and it has groups in several West, East
and Southern African countries. WILDAF groups have focused on
law reform, the popularization of the law, legal literacy and paralegal
training for women as a means of "empowering" them to take control
of their lives. An example of this is provided by a description of the
'Women and Law in Southern Africa' project:
The Women and Law in Southern Africa research project is a
comparative survey of women's legal rights in Zimbabwe, Zambia,
Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana. The project aims
to educate women on their legal rights, provide legal services and
advocacy toward the advancement of women's status.'
WILDAF groups have set up legal aid centers where advice is
offered, counselling done, and when necessary, legal counsel is
provided for court appearances. Women come to the centers seeking
advice or action concerning child support, domestic violence, divorce
and property issues. These centers appear to enjoy the support of the

*Senior Research Fellow, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana; currently in the Ph.D
program in anthropology, Indiana University, Bloomington.
1. WIN 1992 "Women and Law in Southern Africa Project," WINNEWS, Autumn 1992 Vol. 18 No.
4, 53.
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states where they operate, and for the legal profession in particular,
they are seen as evidence of the profession's public spiritedness.
In the discourses of WILDAF groups, members both invoke the
unchallenged power of the law and the law as agency, enabling
people, in this case women, to achieve desired ends.2 Thus in their
view, if the "right" laws were to be passed and widely disseminated,
and appropriate sanctions applied, many of the cases involving, for
example, fathers who wilfully neglect to provide for their children,
would decrease. They also raise the question of the nature of
customary law and its position in the modem legal systems of Africa,
and its definitions of women and their capacities.'

In the view of

these groups, customary law is seen as oppressive of women, and
responsible for the low status of women and the discriminations that
women face in many areas of life. The groups advocate a reform of
the customary law, particularly in the areas relating to family law.
Finally, they suggest in undefined ways, their visions of the
relationship between the law and women in a modem legal system
unfettered by customary law.
These are important issues, some of which I explore in this paper
by means of an extended and rather wide-ranging discussion on the
nature of law and power, discourses and resistances, and the
experience of women with the customary law. 4 I begin with a
discussion of recent debates in legal pluralism to demonstrate what
Chanock 5 calls the false dichotomies that are often asserted by both
the proponents and opponents of change.

2. Collier, J. History and Power in the Study of Law, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1989) 9, 10.
3. Chanock, M. Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia,
Cambridge University Press (1985); M. Chanock "Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law
in an Era of Family Law Reform," 3 InternationalJournal of Law and the Family, (1989) 72-88.
4. I draw on a number of sources, in particular on McKenzie's contribution in Manuh, T.J. Songsore
and Fiona McKenzie "Gender and the Access to Land: The Interface Between Legislative Initiatives,
Customary Tenure and Land Use and Management in Ghana," Report to WEDNET, ELC, Nairobi
(1993).
5. Chanock, M. "Neither Customary nor Legal," Note 3.
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II. Legal Pluralism
The recognition of the existence of a multiplicity of legal systems
within a single state has engaged the attention of scholars for some
time.6 Whether described and analyzed in terms of legal dualism,
legal pluralism or legal plurality, the various accounts have sought to
establish the relation of "other" systems of law to the state or
"dominant" legal system. While the general view has been that the
"other" legal orders created within given social fields are subordinate
to the state legal system, in recent years there have been vigorous
debates among scholars, and there appears to be a marked tendency to
move away from the dualism implicit in classical legal anthropology
to more discursive analysis.' Peter Fitzpatrick argues for a radical
legal pluralism, for which he adopts the term "legal plurality," and
which does not assume such an hierarchical ordering of laws, nor does
it assume the working of legal orders in isolation from each other.
Each one, he argues, is constituted interactively with the other.
Fitzpatrick pursues this argument within a theoretical framework
of theories of articulation of modes of production. Precapitalist modes
persist in the South, in his view, retaining a degree of autonomy and
energy that ensures the continued production of use-value, and interact
with the capitalist mode of production rather than being subsumed
within it. 8 The articulation of modes, he argues, "gives rise to forms
of economic, political and legal organization that cannot be reduced to
either the capitalist mode or a precapitalist mode. "'
Employing a more Foucaultian language, Starr and Collier
advance a similar position in the introduction to History and Power in
the Study of the Law as follows:

6. Santos, B.S. "Law: A map of Misreading Toward A Postmodern Conception of Law," Journal
of Law and Society, Vol. 14 No. 3 (1987) 279-302; Merry, S.E. Getting Justice and Getting Even: The
Legal Consciousness of Working Class Americans, University of Chicago Press (1990).
7. Moore, S.F. "Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study," 7 Law and Society Review (1973) 719-746; Moore, S.F. Social Factsand Fabrications:
Customary Law on Kilamararo1880-1980, Cambridge University Press (1986); Starr, June andJ. Collier
History and Power in the Study of Law, Cornell University Press (1989).
8. P. Fitzpatrick "Law, Plurality and Underdevelopment," in D. Sugarman Legality, Ideology and
the State, Academic Press, London, 159 at 166.
9. Ibid. at 168.
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Legal orders should not be treated as closed cultural systems that
one group can impose on another, but rather as "codes,"
discourses, and languages in which people pursue their varying and
often antagonistic interests. 1

More important, they introduce a view of the law as a resource:
The view that rules are systemic resources permits analysis both of
the power of law to shape events and of the fact that legal rules do
not exist except as evoked by people pursuing particular ends. 1

And, in what he proposes as key components in a "postmodern
conception of law," Bonaventura dos Santos proposes the term
"interlegality" to capture the nature of the "interaction and intersection
among legal spaces," the "uneven and unstable mixing of legal
codes. "12 For him legal pluralism itself is the key concept in a
postmodern view of law, but this is
not the legal pluralism of traditional legal anthropology in which
the different legal orders are conceived as separate entities
coexisting in the same legal space, but rather the conception of
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in
our minds as much as in our actions, ...in ....
crises as in the dull
routine of eventless everyday life. 3

These views of law as resources, manipulable, and subject to
various and contradictory uses and as interpenetrating various fields
are key to the analysis that I make in this paper, in trying to
understand the uses, place and role of customary law in the new states
of Africa and in campaigns for law reform.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Star and Collier op.cit. Note 7 at 9.
Ibid. at 10.
Santos op.cit. Note 6 at 298.
Ibid.
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III. Law, Power and Discourse
In his paper "Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary
Law in an Era of Family Law Reform" Martin Chanock brings out
what he sees as false dichotomies between the upholders of "tradition"
in modem African states ("the symbolical politics of modern Africa")
and their opposers, those who espouse the modern and foreign.
According to Chanock, instead of viewing the problems of so-called
plural systems and custom as unique to Africa, one should locate it as
a "problem arising out of the growth of the state and its modes of
regulation everywhere, both where communities are relatively
homogeneous and where they are culturally and religiously
diverse,"14 and he uses Australian and European examples to
illustrate his positions. 15 Drawing on his earlier work on the theme
of the "invention" of tradition and customary law, Chanock refers to
what he calls "definitional strategies" arising from particular choices
of a view of law. 16 Essentially, his view is that the development of
customary law was a vital part of African political self-assertion under
colonialism. In the post-colonial period also, customary law is a way
of making demands and mapping out political positions. Thus, for
him, customary law is to be treated as a matter of "current politics and
not of culture," and to resist its continuing operation in the postcolonial state involves a "resistance to the political premises and
demands, and not on the basis of the denial of viability or dignity to
an indigenous culture," i.e. a counter-discourse. 1"
Although Chanock does not make reference to Foucault here or
in his 1985 work, both his discussion of the colonial and post-colonial
state, and of customary law as a discourse of power and resistance are
clearly evocative of Foucault and his views on power, knowledge and
discourses.
In his writings on power, Foucault challenges notions of power
that see it in a "juridico-discursive" sense as a property that is
possessed by a few or that can be appropriated by them. Thus while
14.
15.
16.
17.

Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1989) at 73.
See also, C. Gertz Local Knowledge, Basic Books (1983).
Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1989) at 75.
Ibid. at 76.
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power implies domination, it is not centralized, and is not exercised
by someone over someone else. Rather, Foucault insists, power
"circulates"; it is "employed and exercised through a net-like
organization." Not only do individuals circulate between its threads;
they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and
exercising their power. 8
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault discusses its dynamics and its
dialectical nature:
"one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in
tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess;
...
one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a
contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory. "19
Thus power is always relational, inhering as "relations of power"
in all other social relations, and individuals are
"not only its inert or consenting target; they are also the
elements of its articulation... individuals are the vehicles of
power, not its points of articulation. "20
Power then may be conceived as a strategy exercised in a bid for
greater control. But these strategies are also "norms of resistance,"
and the existence of power relations depends on a "multiplicity of
points of resistance." Thus a dialectical relationship is established
between power and resistance and "where there is power," he states,
"there is resistance, and yet, this resistance is never in a position of
exteriority in relation to power," and rarely does such resistance take
the form of "radical ruptures" or massive binary divisions. "21
But power, according to Foucault, also produces knowledge:

18. Foucault, M. "Two Lectures" in C. Gordon (ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michael Foucault, Pantheon Books, New York (1980) 98.
19. Foucault, M. Disciplineand Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Vintage Books, New York (1979)
26.
20. Foucault, M. op.cit. Note 18..
21. Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Random House, New York (1978) 95.
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"power produces knowledge.. .power and knowledge directly imply
one another; ...there is no power relation without the correlative

constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does
not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. "'
In the construction of power/knowledge, the knowledge of those
less powerful in society become silent or subjugated, and in Foucault's
work the latter include the knowledge of the psychiatric patient, the
criminal, the ill person. In the colonial situation that we shall be
analyzing shortly, we may also add that the knowledge generally of
the colonized, and specifically of particular groups-subjects, migrants,
women and youth are subjugated, and their discourses become muted.
How does all of this relate to law? According to Turkel, law or
laws become one element, in the "expansion of power-or, more
accurately-powers" and by extension, resistances. As such, law is
neither autonomous nor determined by economic and political
structures; rather it "must be analysed in terms of its internal relations
of power and knowledge as well as its relations to other discourses and
sources of power. "23 In the same way therefore that relations of
power and knowledge are articulated through discourse, so law is
constructed through multiple discourses that create and thereby define
24
socially acceptable fields of normative order.
These "normalizing discourses, grounded in dominant institutions,
rationality and science" combine with "juridical categories" and state
power to create interlinking patterns of knowledge and control.25
IV. The Creation of Customary Law
Fitzpatrick argues that in pursuit of the imperial project, law was
"operatively at the forefront," and provided the means by which
colonial rule was legitimated. This resulted in a "customary world"
that matched the operation of the colonial administration and that could
22.
23.
17 No.
24.
25.

Foucault, M. op.cit. Note 19 at 27.
Turkel, G. "Michel Foucault: Law, Power and Knowledge," Journal of Law and Society Vol.
2 (1990) 170 at 189.
See also Yngresson, B. Virtuous Citizens Disruptive Subjects, Routledge, New York (1993) 20.
Turkel, op.cit. Note 23 at 172.
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be "elaborated on to conform to the demands of imperialism." 26 This
creation of the customary law in specific African contexts to meet the
interests of colonial authorities, chiefs, elders and men generally has
been analyzed critically.
It became a political instrument, a "language of legitimation,"
which served the ends of both the colonial administration and chiefs
in Malawi and Zambia. The creation of this legal order involved a
fundamental change in the nature of law:
The essence of the customary systems may be said to have lain in
their processes, but these were displaced, and the flexible principles
that had guided them were now fed into a rule-honing and -using
machine operating in new political circumstances. 27
Processes such as marriage, divorce and succession, that formerly
were the concern only of kin groups and clan authorities and subject
to negotiations and compromises, were transformed and their fluidity
and flexibility lost as they now became matters to be heard at Native
courts. New "traditions" and customs were invented to create new
norms. As Chanock points out, while these previous negotiations and
compromises were not necessarily consensual or egalitarian, nor more
amicable than legal processes, their outcomes depended on the
comparative positions of social power of the contestants. 28 Even
more important, norms play a part in negotiations different from that
which they play in legal processes, and while they may be used to
stake out negotiating positions from which to proceed or as a sounding
board as to the correct procedure, they cannot be cited as rules or
conditions that will be imposed. When the colonial power could not
find appropriate indigenous forms or laws to extend their purpose,
these "might be imagined into existence," and with respect to Malawi
and Zambia, a customary law was made by men both anxious and
authoritarian, determined to rebuild.
Their materials were the
summary and technical legalism of British forms of justice, a remote
26. Fitzpatrick op.cit. Note 8 at 12.
27. Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1985) at 62.
28. Ibid. at 80.
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and despotic legal style, a fiery view of sin, and above all, the vision
of a strict and moral golden age.29
Customary law was treated as "foreign law" and had to be proved
in successive cases until it had gained sufficient notoriety. According
to Woodman, this illustrated the distance created between "lawyers'
customary law" and "sociologists' customary law," the former
referring to that law applied within the state courts, the latter to that
is "socially recognized outside." 3 This was to change further the
nature of "true custom," which was indistinguishable from social
relations. The lawyers' customary law that emerged, Woodman
argues, had a "creative function": a discourse more in tune with the
values of a "modem bourgeois society" was created compared to that
found outside the courts; and the "certainty" of such a legal order
Following Ranger,32 McKenzie
served the imperial enterprise. 3
notes that the codification of "customary law" in Africa silenced
particular knowledges, and disadvantaged four particular groups of
indigenous people: youth vis A vis elders; women vis a vis men;
"subjects' vis A vis chiefs; and migrants vis A vis an indigenous
population, as new traditions were invented to bring these groups
firmly under control. For women, these concerned mostly claims over
their sexuality in marriage, their right to divorce, and their labor.
Chanock details the many attempts and uncertainties of a period in
transition in both rural and urban areas, as customs were invented and
the powers of chiefs inflated to control female "indiscipline. "3
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s around Africa, such creations
and inventions were underway. Reports record attempts by the Sefwi
state in the Gold Coast (Ghana) to control women's sexuality, and
attempts by chiefs to round up spinsters in parts of colonial Ashanti
(Ghana) and imprison them until they would name a man to be
29. Ibid.
30. Woodman, G. "Customary Law, State Courts and the Notion of Institutionalization of Norms in
Ghana and Nigeria," in A. Allot and G.R. Woodman (eds.) People's Law and the State, Foris
Publications (1985) 143 cited in T. Manuh op.cit. Note 4.
31. Ibid.
32. Ranger, T. "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa" in E. Hobsbaum and T. Ranger (eds.)
The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press (1983) 254.
33. Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1985).
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released to. These examples show the extremities of such attempts,
which even the colonial administration felt unable to support.34
Chanock documents a strong element of gender and generational
conflict in the creation and enforcement of customary law, as well as
a disintegration of the community in which law emerged. At the same
time, a counter discourse was set up, and Chanock writes: "an
emerging class conflict, conflict between generations and between
genders are all apparent, and claims about custom were a way of
legitimating positions in all three. "" Thus although law was an
imposed form, it was also logically adopted by many Africans, and
became part of their own strategies for staking out claims, and women
as well as men utilized these discourses, as we see in the next section.
V. Women's Use of the Customary Law
According to McKenzie and others, the evidence is overwhelming
that customary law was constructed to further the ends of male control
over women, and women's knowledges were suppressed as their
knowledge and experience of legal order went unrecorded. At the
same time however, there were also opportunities for women to use
this legal order for their own purposes.3 6
To quote Foucault again:
we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments
whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more
precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the
dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of
discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies.
It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said
34. Jean Allman found a reference to this while researching Meyer Fortes' papers at Cambridge, and
using oral histories has been able to track down some women who were victims of this practice - ASA
1993 Panel on "Women's Search for Autonomy in C 19th and C20th Ghana - Marriage and Non-Marriage
as Options."
35. Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1985) at 236.
36. McKenzie, F. "Gender and Land Rights in Murang's District, Kenya," Journal of Peasant
Studies Vol. 17 No. 4 (1990) 609; Manuh, T. "The Asantehemaa's Court and Its Jurisdiction Over
Women: A Study in Legal Pluralism," Research Review Vol. 4 No. 2 (1988) 50.
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and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden,
which it comprises; with the variants and different
effects-according to who is speaking, his (sic) position of power,
the institutional context in which he (sic) happens to be
situated-that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilisations of
identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes. 7
While many Africans avoided the use of Native Authority courts
in Central Africa for sensitive family and property cases, to avoid tie
"judgment by decree which has become a feature of the Native
Courts," research on women's recourse to colonial courts has shown
that they were able at times, and with some ambiguity, to use the
courts to their advantage. 8
Vaughan's analysis of district court divorce cases in Southern
Malawi illustrates how women used the colonial legal system to resist
male efforts to undermine the matrilineal system, and also took
advantage of the colonial juridical tendency to push for male familial
responsibility. Thus women expanded the duties of a husband to
include paying tax on the hut built for them, while they resisted the
husbands' insistence that they live virilocally. The non-payment of tax
was generally sufficient grounds for a woman to obtain a divorce in
a district court, whereas ill-treatment was not, and a woman could
obtain a divorce on the grounds of her husband's tax evasion even
where she refused his offer of such payment.3 9
McKenzie also cites Mbilinyi to show women's resistance to a
"customary marriage," which was a central component of the
organization of the labour process under colonial rule. This resistance
commonly took the form of running away from husbands or male kin
to another man. While the discourse in the courts "reflect(ed) the
repressive reality" of the marriage system, some women used this
legal order to their advantage, for example through the manipulation
37. Foucault op.cit. Note 21 at 101.
38. Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1985) 229.
39. Vaughn, M. The Story ofan African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth-Century Malawi,
Cambridge University Press (1987) cited in McKenzie op.cit. Note 36.
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of claims of violence, one of the few acceptable grounds for
divorce.40
McKenzie's work in Kenya demonstrates the use of the discourse
of custom by women and men as one strategy among many to exert
pressure in disputes over land and labour, in a changed situation of the
commodification of agricultural production in Murang'a district.4 '
Through engaging in practices such as that of female husbands,
women have made up for lack of male heirs, and have circumvented
the claims of brothers-in-law and other affines to inherit clan land in
the absence of male heirs.
In parts of Ghana, women have resisted the demands of husbands
to extend their labor obligations to producing cash crops. While
married, women as well as men have to contribute food and other
goods for the upkeep of families. Women work on farms or sell
produce to be able to fulfil these demands. With the introduction of
cocoa and the increasing commoditization of agricultural production
in the 1920s, husbands expected wives to contribute labor to the
making of farms, under the fiction of their labor contributions as part
of the marriage contract; but this produced property that could only be
inherited by blood relations. In Asante, where cocoa production was
important, these demands came to a head, when women distinguished
their "customary" labor obligations to produce food for their
households from the new wealth that was being created. Women
argued that in Asante custom, husbands had control over the labor of
women they had married as pawns, while "free" women were not
under similar obligations. These free women would contribute their
labor only if they were assured that their husbands would give them
a share of the farm, or if he would purchase land for them elsewhere
to start their own farms.42 Where they did not see this as
40. McKenzie op.cit. Note 36 citing Mbilinyi, M. "Runaway Wives in Colonial Tanganyika: Forced
Labour and Forced Marriage in Rungwe District 1919-1961," InternationalJournal of the Sociology of
Law Vol. 16 No. 1, I.
41. Ibid.
42. These women were aware that they were not creating a joint enterprise with their husbands nor
even desired that it be so. What they were concerned with was to create property which was clearly
divisible and not merged in the enterprise of the husband, and to secure what they regarded as a fair
share. Failure to do so created problems with the husband's kin in the event of his death. (cf. Abebrese
v. Kaah [1972 GLR]).
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forthcoming, women might resort to a divorce, or go to court to claim
a share of the product created by their labor. These problems were
extremely acute among the Akan where matrilineal succession was the
norn, and neither wives nor their children were "customary"
inheritors. Attempts in the 1930s and 1940s by various state councils
of chiefs to change the customary law to allow wives and children to
inherit parts of property were resisted by the colonial administration,
and judgements of the Native Courts based on these resolutions were
set aside on appeal. It was stated in Kosia & others v. Nimo that "the
recommendations had at no time received the sanction of the
Governor-in-Council {and} the native customary law as to inheritance
stands as it did upon the foundation of ancient custom and that is the
law by which the native courts in Ashanti are bound to administer,
whatever may be the private views of individual members of those
courts. ",43 This was despite the fact that the colonial administration
itself had introduced a new form of marriage under the Ordinance that
gave the parties married thereunder new property rights, obviously not
founded on the "ancient custom" of any Ghanaian groups. The refusal
of the colonial administration to permit changes in the "customary
law" was to lead to a movement for reform in the family law. The
Federation of Gold Coast Women, formed in 1951, was led by elite
women, many of whom were married under the Ordinance.
Nevertheless, they identified with the many women in both matrilineal
and patrilineal inheritance systems who had no heritable rights in the
estates of their husbands. They submitted several petitions to the
colonial government, to no avail, asking for uniformity in inheritance
rights for women. It was not until 1985 that a law was passed giving
spouses and children rights to the estate of the other spouse and parent
respectively, on their death intestate.'
It is instructive that the women making demands couched them in
terms of custom, relying in this case on what was "reasonable"
according to customary law, and clearly evoking flexible and fluid
versions of customary law that required what was "reasonable" under
the circumstances, rather than a fixed adherence to some immutable
principles. In this way custom becomes what Chanock calls a political
43. Laws of the Gold Coast 1951, Revised Edition, Vol. III, Accra.
44. This is the Intestate Succession Law 1985, PNDCL 111.
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instrument and customary law a strategy for "making demands and
mapping out political positions." This "symbolic framework" becomes
an arena to reinterpret or create elements of custom in the attempt by
women and men, differentiated by class, to gain access to land, labor
and other productive resources as these take on different value with
the commodification of agricultural production.' 5
These accounts of the struggles by women around Africa are
important means to recapture the agency of women themselves, and
serve as a corrective to the "woman-as-victim" depiction in several
accounts of the lives of African women. They also challenge views
of the universal subordination of women and the discourse of the
"other" in the construction of a monolithic "third world woman. ",46
VI. The Movement for Law Reform
Since independence, under various guises of Africanization or
modernization, the claims of customary law have been pushed or
disallowed, and its use as discourse has never been clearer. These
discourses are not perceived as all of one order or equally useful in
particular contexts. As Foucault puts it:
'amongst the discourses of previous epochs or of foreign cultures,
which are the ones that are retained, which are valued, which are
imported, which one tries, to reconstitute?' 47
And who can appropriate which discourses?:
'what individuals, what groups, what classes have access to such
a kind of discourse? In what way is the relationship between the
discourse and he who gives it, and he who receives it
institutionalized'? (and among) classes, nations, linguistic, cultural
45.
46.
Women
47.

Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1989) at 78.
Mohanty, C. "Under Western Eyes" in Chandra T. Mohanty and others (eds.) Third World
and the Politics of Feminism, Indiana University Press (1991).
Foucault, M. "History, Discourse and Discontinuity," Salmangundi 20 (1972) 225, 234.
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or ethnic collectivities' (how is the struggle to define the discourse
effected?).'

Chanock brings out the appropriation of customary law at the
national level by states intent on showing the "continuities" between
the African past and the present. This "symbolic capital of tradition"
is opposed on the other hand by the modernisers, those from the law
and development perspective who see customary law as a "traditional
obstacle," a "survival" which needs to be modemised, and press for
reforms in marriage and family life among others."a
But as is obvious, customary law can hardly be regarded as the
"dead hand of tradition." On the contrary, it has represented the
responses of living interests, and it may be "convenient to depict them
as traditional and on the way out because they are often not interests
which coincide with those of the developers. "50
What is clear though is that many reformers challenge what may
be termed the authoritarian legalism of neo-traditional customary law,
and the use of custom to defend conservative positions, as a defensive
response by elements in several African societies to try to erect and
emphasize particular forms of family, marriage, duty, right and
obligation. Under colonialism, family law became the one area where
custom was allowed unlimited sway, and the neo-traditional customary
law has been preserved in most modem African constitutions through
the exemption of customary law as applied to marriage, divorce and
devolution of property from any general application of discriminatory
principles. To be sure, attempts at reform have been made, most
notably in the countries that achieved independence through armed
struggle, where a type of revolutionary legality was introduced that
explicitly ignored many customary rules and promoted legalistic
informalism. In Tanzania, attempts have been made to unify
customary law and to strengthen the power of formal courts. In
Zimbabwe, attempts at reform have been more complicated, and an
amended version of customary law was introduced, to free the Primary
Courts from the taints of cooperation with the former settler, racist
48. Ibid.
49. Chanock op.cit. Note 3.
50. Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1985) at 237.
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regime, while important elements of customary law were retained in
family law. But changes in the law affecting the maintenance of wives
and children, made in 1981, and the Legal Age of Majority Act 1982
giving full legal majority to women at 18 seem to have undermined the
marriage regime based on bridewealth and courts have been flooded
with petitions by women seeking relief. As well, there is active
debate oft the practice of lobola, bridewealth payments, not only in
Zimbabwe but in the Southern African region, where vestiges of
Roman-Dutch law also remain to reinforce women's minority in the
law, and this is very much a focus of the work of the Women and
Law in Southern Africa Project.
Presently, there is active debate also on the future of customary
law in a democratic South Africa, which covers similar grounds, but
also takes in the peculiarities of the South African state that fostered
a version of customary law suited to its apartheid policy."' In his
discussion, Chanock raises an important issue that is applicable by
extension not only to South Africa but to the circumstances of many
African states, and the prospects of successful law reform. According
to him, the major issues as far as family law is concerned are not only
customary law and pluralism, but also the pattern of urbanization that
developed in South Africa under a system of strict influx control.
Effectively, it has given women few alternatives to unwanted
marriages as it has drastically limited their labor-market opportunities,
and made the rights of women who remain in town dependent on
marriage. Within this framework, neither the civil law nor customary
law has served women's interests. He cautions against the repetition
of the colonial tactic of imposing laws on African societies under the
2
guise of the protection of women.
This caution is necessary and raises the issue of whose vision of
change and progress is advanced in the demands for law reform. On
the one hand, there are the everyday resistances of rural and poor
urban women who actively manipulate the practices, rules,
prohibitions and norms that collectively could be said to be their
51. Chanock, M. "Law, State and Culture: Thinking About 'Customary Law' After Apartheid," Acta
Juridica (1992) 52.
52. Ibid. at 63-64.
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experience of customary law, as they demand access to some resource
or refuse their labor for some enterprise. The evasions of parental
control over marriage, through elopements and other means to avoid
the payment of bridewealth, and the subversion of male control
through adultery or divorce, must be seen as attempts, however
muted, to engage in other discourses and practices, other traditions of
customary marriage and living arrangements. These are highly
contested, subject to negotiation and constantly evolving.
On the other hand are the discourses of the modernisers, often
rooted in discourses removed from the time and place, and likely to
be opposed as the introduction of "foreign" practices. While many of
the reformers genuinely believe in the justice of their cause, often they
fail to see that these new ideas, these new visions also embody
particular ideological assumptions, and are as much inventions as the
customary law they oppose. As Chanock puts it graphically, the
ideas embodied in the critique of the view of the traditional and the
reformist thrust toward gender and social equality, ...are also
products of a particular political and ideological milieu.. .we must
[therefore] try to understand these current ideas as part of history,
applying to them the same kind of analysis that we do to those of
the past. 3
In the movements for reform, there has been a reliance on the
state to support and initiate reforms, reflecting perhaps the weakness
of the forces of reform. However, this seems to be part of a
worldwide trend as the state has emerged as a large force in people's
lives, and seems to be the arbiter in intimate family relations. Thus
Chanock comments on the role of the state that as 'initiator,
developer, reformer and protector' in Western Europe over the course
of the last century. The state now protects children's rights even
against parents', and the rights of wives against husbands, and has
taken on redistributive roles to foster or create gender equity." This
has led to some 'suspicion' over the role of 'patriarchy', and certainly
over the ceding so much of 'private' ground to the 'public', and this
53. Chanock op.cit. Note 3 (1989) at 86.
54. Ibid. at 88.
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is seen as an incomplete strategy.5" Happily, Chanock suggests that
some of this might be avoided in Africa because of the vibrancy of
alternative institutions outside the law and the state, institutions which
might provide better building blocks than those legitimated by the
colonial state. However, it is doubtful how many of these views are
shared by the advocates of change, many of them lawyers, whose
discourse is still very much part of the dominant discourse of law and
legality. Such discourses, with their focus on the legal, often do not
take in the counter-discourses and cultures of the poor and the
dispossessed, which utilize the language of custom and of customary
law itself to struggle against aspects they consider oppressive or
unresponsive to their needs. The vision, as Santos prophesies, cannot
be an "either/or," "tradition vs. modernity," but the metamorphosis of
forms into the chameleon, ever-changing and adaptable, a new
customary law, seen clearly as an "invention," of a broad swell of the
population, but an invention nevertheless.5 6 There have never been
certainties of the outcomes of reforms, as the contrasting experiences
of women across the globe exhibit. The experiences of women in
several African states that have been recounted here demonstrate
adaptability to change, engagement in discourses, agencies and
knowledge that must be harnessed in any movements for change. The
content of this change cannot be determined in advance but, like the
customary law that these women have often sought to recapture, it is
flexible and adaptable.
55. MacKinnon, C. "Feminism, Marxism and the State," Signs (1982).
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